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CASE COMMENTS
cal interstate and international trade in white slaves, 'the busi-
ness of securing white women and girls and of selling them
outright, or of exploiting them for immoral purposes.' "23
It may be that Judge Medina's decision in the Ross case will initi-
ate a much needed trend toward a stricter construction of the Mann
Act by the judiciary. By ignoring certain facts of the principal case
and while apparently following prior decisions, the Second Circuit has
in fact circumvented the precedent set up by the Supmere Court in
Caminetti and has in effect held that a single incident of interstate
transportation for immoral purposes is not within the scope of the
Mann Act. This is certainly a desirable result to be reached in apply-
ing the Mann Act when viewed in the light of the original intent of
Congress in passing the Act. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will
take notice of this correct result, though reached by rather devious
means, and will heed the words of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall-"It
is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime and ordain
its punishment."
2 3
SAMUEL L. BARE, III
EFFECT OF ADULTERY ON CUSTODY AWARDS
At common law the father was considered the natural guardian
of the issue of a marriage. It was said in an 1875 House of Lords de-
cision that "the father's right to the guardianship of his child is high
and sacred. Our law holds it in much reverence; and it should not be
taken from him without gross misconduct on his own part and danger
of injury to the health or morals of the children."' An 1878 Virginia
case added that "the father is universally considered as having claims
paramount to those of the mother....-2 Evolution of the law has
brought about a drastic change in this view in a relatively short
2329 U.S. at 27. Though the formal title of the Mann Act is the White Slave
Trafiic Act, the wording "any woman or girl" in the body of the Act seems to
indicate that there is no distinction to be drawn from the word "White" in the
title of the Act. The term "white slave" usually connotes a female held for the
purpose of commercial prostitution against her will. It is believed that this word
was coined at a time in the history of the United States when the institution of
Negro slavery was still in existence (or shortly thereafter) in order to distinguish
slavery of women for the purpose of prostitution from that of the involuntary servi-
tude of the Negro race prevalent in this country at that time.
"'United States v. Wiltberger, 4 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 574, 576 (182o).
'Symington v. Symington, 1870-75 2 A.C. 415, 425 (H.L. 1875) (Scot.).
'Latham v. Latham, 73 Va. (3o Gratt.) 110, 119 (1878).
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period of time, so that today a mother who commits adultry may be
preferred over the father as the proper custodian for the issue of a
marriage.
In Oliver v. Oliver3 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the
custody award of a three-year-old girl to her mother when there was
strong evidence tending to prove that she had been guilty of adultry.
Mrs. Oliver, taking her child with her, abandoned her husband to
live in an apartment in another city where she engaged in a course
of conduct "not consistent with a normal friendship between a virtuous
woman and continent man." 4 Her paramour, who had a toothbrush
and pillow at Mrs. Oliver's apartment, was called "Daddy Taylor" by
the little girl.5 The lower court awarded Mr. Oliver a divorce on the
ground of desertion, notwithstanding substantial evidence which
showed his wife to be an adulteress, and awarded Mrs. Oliver custody
of the little girl. Mr. Oliver appealed to the Court of Appeals for re-
versal of the custody award. This court found that the lower court
had erred in requiring adultery to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt6 but did not reverse the custody award, stating that "even if
we assume that the wife did commit adultery, as the evidence in this
case appears to indicate, the result so far as present custody is con-
cerned would be the same." 7 The court justified this position by dis-
tinguishing prior decisions in which adultery by the wife had been
proven and the custody of the children had been given to the father.8
The majority found that an important factor in these earlier cases was
3217 Md. 222, 14o A.2d 908 (1958).
414o A.2d at 909.
6Evidence that the little girl called the paramour "Daddy Taylor" and referred
to Daddy Taylor's toothbrush and pillow in Mrs. Oliver's apartment show that the
relationship between the couple was carried on in front of the child. Evidence such
as this has, in some cases, been considered important in establishing sufficient moral
depravity on the part of the mother to render her an unfit custodian for the child.
Revier v. Revier, 48 Wash. 2d 231, 292 P.2d 861 (1956); Vogel v. Vogel, 259 Wis.
373, 48 N.W.2d 5o (1951).
GAdultery in a criminal proceeding, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because of the difficulty in catching spouses in the actual act of adultery, a different
test is used in divorce proceedings. It must be proved that the accused spouse has
an adulterous disposition and also has had an opportunity to commit adultery. Then
the judges in this equity proceeding decide whether or not a reasonable and just
man would infer from the facts presented that an act of adultery took place. Revier
v. Revier, 48 Wash. 2d 231, 292 P.2d 861, 862 (1956).
714o A.2d at g1o.
'The cases distinguished were: Townsend v. Townsend, 205 Md. 591, lo9 A.2d
765 (1954); Trudeau v. Trudeau, 204 Md. 214, 1o3 A.2d 562 (1954); Pekar v. Pekar,
188 Md. 360, 52 A.2d 468 (1947); Stimis v. Stimis, 186 Md. 489, 47 A.2d 497 (1946);
Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, io6 At. 337 (1919).
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that the wife had continued her misconduct during the time of the
court proceedings, while in the present case Mrs. Oliver had been
virtuous during this period. Basing its decision on this distinguishing
factor, the court concluded that if the mother had led a virtuous life
between the commencement of the action and the handing down of
the final decree, she could be a proper custodian for the child.
It was argued in a strong dissent that the father should have been
awarded the custody of the child. The dissenting judge thought that
the person responsible for the marital misfortune should not bene-
fit by the rift, and moreover that an innocent husband, reduced to a
state of cuckoldry, should not be required to "pay for the child's
support, and, at the same time, to permit his wife, an adjudicated
adulteress, to rear his child." 9 The dissent further pointed out that
the one consistent factor in the cases distinguished by the majority
was that the father had been awarded custody of the children in every
case in which the mother had committed adultery.10
On the basis of Swoyer v. Swoyer," it would appear that the dis-
senting opinion, which would have awarded custody to the innocent
father, is correct. In that case the Maryland Court of Appeals awarded
custody to a father who gambled and drank heavily and who had no
fixed place of abode, in preference to a mother who engaged in what
the court called "open and notorious" illicit conduct. In fact, adultery
was proven by circumstantial evidence and she might have been com-
pletely innocent.
Prior to the 1920's Massachusetts appears to be the only jurisdiction
that had awarded the custody of a child to an adulteress. 12 When more
recent decisions are considered, however, it appears that the majority
in the Oliver case has much support for its position which awards
custody to the mother, even if she did commit adultery.'3 Although
014o A.2d at 914.
1'In light of the prior prevailing attitude expressed by the Maryland decisions
(cited in note 8 supra) a subtle argument dealing with the conduct of the accused
during the period between the commencement of the divorce suit and the time that
the decree is handed down seems relatively unimportant. Such a distinction is mis-
leading for it implies that if adultery is not committed during this period of time,
this fact will be considered a mitigating circumstance by the court. In this light the
argument stressed by the majority appears for what it really is-a convenient ration-
ale to justify a departure from precedent.
'1157 Md. 18, 145 Ad. 19o (1929).
-In Haskell v. Haskell, 152 Mass. 6, N.E. 859 (189o), the mother was a bigamist.
She was given the custody of two boys aged four and five until they became older.
1By 1958 nine other jurisdictions in the following chronological order, rendered
such a custody decree: Harmon v. Harmon, 111 Kan. 786, 208 Pac. 647 (1922); In re
De Leon, 70 Cal. App. 1, 232 Pac. 738 (1924); Kruczek v. Kruczek, 29 N.Y.S.2d 385
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the courts are generally stern when dealing with adultery, there has
been a recent trend which shows much leniency in favor of adulterous
mothers. For example, at one time an act of adultery by the mother
14
was treated as a conclusive presumption of her unfitness to care for
her child. Today the presumption, although it still exists, has become
rebuttable. Modern appellate courts look more carefully at the cir-
cumstances surrounding the act of adultery1 5 and at the comparative
character of the spouses in order to determine which is the better
custodian for the children. In arriving at an award certain factors are
considered which help to determine the degree of moral laxity in the
adulteress' character. The wife's reasons for commiting adultery are
considered, as well as the frequency of the acts, the number of para-
mours, the discretion involved, and the possible later marriage to the
paramour.16 Her character is then compared with that of her husband.
In Norman v. Norman'7 the husband invited his brother, a man
of distasteful habits, to live in his household. The husband neglected
his wife socially and sexually and ignored her protests against having
(Supp. Ct. '94i); Norman v. Norman, 27 Wash. 2d 25, 176 P.2d 349 ('947); Ziontz v.
Ziontz, 324 Mich. 155, 36 N.W.2d 882 (1949); Lucas v. Lucas, 119 Ind. App. 360, 86
N.E.2d 3oo (1949); Matfierd v. Matfierd, 1o N.J. Super. 132, 76 A.2d 722 (1950);
Pachkofsky v. Pachkofsky, 192 Ore. 627, 236 P.2d 320 (1951); French v. French, 236
Minn. 439, 53 N..2d 215 (1952).
"This article deals exclusively with adultery by the mother, not only because
this is the fact situation in Oliver v. Oliver, but also because there are relatively few
cases on the subject dealing with adultery by the husband. It would appear from
those cases which can be found that an adulterous husband has never been awarded
custody of his child. E.g., Jeans v. Jeans, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 142 (1836); Crabtree v.
Crabtree, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 438, 85 S.W. 211 (Ct. App. 1905); Small v. Small, 28 Neb.
843, 45 N.W. 248 (1890); Straughan v. Straughan, 115 W.Va. 639, 177 S.E. 771
(1934)-
"-The writing styles of opinions in cases where distasteful fact situations are
present roughly compares with the literary works of the era. Thus in Kremelberg v.
Kremelberg, 52 Md. 553 (1879), the opinion is written with the taste and discretion
of Henry James, while in Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581 (1928), the sex-
ual frankness of James Gould Cozzens prevails. This change in the literary form
lends itself to a thorough discussion of facts in an adultery case.
"6See notes 20-23 infra. Additional elements in the final determination are (i)
the age and sex of the child and (2) the preference of a child deemed to be of age to
make an intelligent choice. These elements are not considered here, because neither
is decisive unless the equities between the spouses are evenly divided. In cases in-
volving adultery the parents fitness to care for the child is considered more import-
ant to the child's welfare than age or sex. Currin v. Currin, 125 Cal. App. 2d 644,
271 P.2d 61 (1954); Pangle v. Pangle, 134 Md. 166, lo6 At. 337 ('919); Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 224 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949); Martin v. Martin, 27 Wash. 2d 308, 178 P.2d
284 (1947). Even when the child becomes older and capable of making an intelligent
choice, the court will not honor this choice when it thinks the child's best interests
will be better served in a different manner. Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d
844 (1949)-
'727 Wash. 2d 25, 176 P.2d. 349 (1947).
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to live with the degenerate brother. As a consequence of the resulting
estrangement between husband and wife, Mrs. Norman became en-
amoured with another man and committed adultery with him. The
court found that her actions did not disqualify her from being a fit
person to have custody of the child. Here the abuse and neglect by
the husband were seen as a cause for her seeking other companionship
and did not disqualify her from having sufficient moral fiber to be a
good mother and to be preferred over the child's father.
In Gibson v. Gibson'8 the wife did not have mitigating circum-
stances surrounding her adultery, but the husband, in accounting for
his conduct in a prior custody proceeding, had impeached his own
character before the court. The mother, now married to the man with
whom she had committed adultery, was living on a farm in a healthy
atmosphere, while the only provision the father could make for the
child was an overcrowded house with his relatives, an atmosphere
considered by the court not to be proper for the rearing of a young
child. The marriage to her former paramour was a factor in the
mother's favor, for it showed that her former indiscretions were based
on true affection rather than caprice. In this case the court compared
the character of the spouses and the atmosphere that each intended
to provide for the child, and accordingly the mother was awarded
custody.
In Lucas v. Lucas19 the adulterous wife was granted custody of the
five and one-half year old boy because the husband was shown to be
of bad character. Evidence that he once struck her in the stomach in
an attempt to produce an abortion was given much weight by the
court in its decision. In deciding that an award to the mother would
be in the best interests of the child, even though she had been
indiscreet, the court indicated that a comparison of characters of the
spouses and their relative ability to bring up a useful citizen must
form the basis for the final decision.
The above cases are exceptions to the general rule that mothers
who commit adultery are not fit to raise their children. Where the
mother was indiscreet,20 or had a number of paramours, 21 or was filthy
1196 Ore. 198, 247 P.2d 757 (1952).
'9iig Ind. App. 36o, 86 N.E.2d 3oo (1949).
20Wilson v. Wilson, 124 Cal. App. 655, 13 P.2d 376 (1932); Vallandingham v.
Vallandingham, 232 Ky. 123, 22 S.W.2d 424 (1929); Winfield v. Winfield, 203 Miss.
391, 35 So.2d 443 (1948); Manville v. Manville, 81 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935);
Norcross v. Norcross, 176 Ore. 1, 155 P.2d 562 (1945); Revier v. Revier, 48 Wash.
2d 231, 292 P.2d 861 (1956); Vogel v. Vogel, 259 Wis. 373, 48 N.W.2d 501 (1951).
IVallandingham v. Vallandingham, 232 Ky. 123, 22 S.W.2d 424 (1929); Evans
v. Evans, 57 S.W. 367 (renn. Ct. Ch. App. 19oo); Smith v. Frates, 107 Wash 13, i8o
Pac. 88o (19i9).
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in her personal habits, 22 or was shown to have little moral fiber,
23
she was properly not awarded the custody of the child.
It is admitted that a wife who commits adultery cannot be a woman
of the best moral character, but it must also be admitted that, as com-
pared to her husband, an adulterous wife may be the better custodian
for the issue of the marriage. The modern position which creates a
presumption against the adulterous wife which can be rebutted by
further evidence takes proper cognizance of this possibility.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, with its statement that "even if we
assume that the wife did commit adultery.., the result so far as the
present custody proceeding is concerned would be the same,"2 4 has
aligned itself with the modern trend toward leniency in cases where
adultery is involved. The case may be criticized, however, for if it
were followed to its logical extreme, i.e., if the case were remanded and
if Mrs. Oliver were found guilty of adultery, an exception would be
created for which there were no exceptional circumstances. In this
new, hypothetical Oliver case the husband would be of good character,
and the wife would be an adjudicated adulteress with no mitigating
circumstances surrounding her act; yet the court would nevertheless
award her the young child.
By its decision in the Oliver case, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has authorized Maryland courts to award custody of a child to a
mother who has been adjudged an adulteress, as long as her conduct
during the proceeding has been virtuous and even though her hus-
band has been proven to be of good moral character. By such a decis-
ion it would appear that this court has dispensed with precedent and,
in effect, considers an act of adultery as carrying with it no presump-
tion of unfitness to raise a moral child. It appears that Maryland, in
Oliver v. Oliver, is leading rather than following a trend.
JOHN PARKER HILs
2Taylor v. Taylor, 224 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
"Vagiakos v. Vagiakos, 243 Mich. 1, 219 N.W. 615 (1928); Bunim v. Bunim, 298
N.Y. 391, 83 N.E.2d 848 (1949); Martin v. Martin, 27 Wash. 2d 3o8, 178 P.2d 284
(1947); Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 W.Va. 7o8, 68 S.E.2d 361 (1951).
2Supra note 7.
